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By late 2008, it seemed obvious that the market could make grave errors,
harming many and bringing the U.S. economy to its knees.1 Deregulation
appeared a tarnished concept on the wane.2 And with the election of Barack
Obama, we seemed on the verge of a new era of regulation.3 So what happened?
Cass Sunstein occupied the “cockpit” of the regulatory state, as head of the
Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) for virtually all of the
President Obama’s first term. In Simpler: The Future of Government, he combines
his extraordinary grasp of the literature on behavioral economics with astute
observations about its implications for contemporary regulatory controversies.
Simpler is not primarily a chronicle of Sunstein’s tenure. Thus he spends little
or no time discussing some of the regulatory controversies during Obama’s
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See Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, 112th Cong., Fin. Crisis Inquiry Rep.: Final Rep. of
the Nat’l Comm’n on the Causes of the Fin. and Econ. Crisis in the U.S. xv–xvi (2011)
(describing the consequences of the September 2008 financial collapse).

2.

See id. at xviii; Eric Lipton, With Obama, Regulations Are Back In Fashion, N.Y. Times, May 13,
2010, at A15 (noting the Bush administration’s “tacit acknowledgment” in late 2008 “that its
deregulatory agenda had gone too far”).

3.

Lipton, supra note 2 (“A new age of regulation is well under way in Washington . . .”). See also
Barack H. Obama, Renewing the American Economy, Address at the Cooper Union, New
York (Mar. 27, 2008) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/us/politics/27textobama.html (discussing the need for legal reforms and a change in culture to establish a
“21st century regulatory system”).
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first term: the Affordable Care Act,4 implementation of Dodd-Frank,5 the
controversy regarding RU-486,6 and two major decisions invalidating SEC
regulations after subjecting the agency’s cost-benefit analysis to rigorous
review.7
Sunstein’s principal aim is to explain and defend what might be described
as “cost-benefit analysis 2.0.” The Reagan Administration established a
regulatory review architecture that required agencies to weigh the costs and
benefits of regulatory initiatives, under OIRA “supervision.”8 At base, this
first-generation cost-benefit analysis seemed to assume that regulated entities
acted along the lines postulated by classical economics, deliberately weighing
costs and benefits. And regulatory review’s primary targets were mandates
imposed upon business to protect public health and safety.
Sunstein has long been a devotee of cost-benefit analysis (150, 152, 156, 172).9
Despite such devotion, in Simpler he does raise questions about the limits of
such calculations and evaluates claims that agencies systematically err in their
assessments of costs and benefits (158–60, 163–72, 174–77). Sunstein also agrees
that “incentives matter,” i.e., that regulated entities and citizens sometimes
deliberately weigh costs and benefits, and that government can alter their
conduct by modifying those incentives (210).
However, Sunstein explains, based on insights gleaned from behavioral
economics, individuals often do not deliberate. Instead they act impulsively in
ways that harm their own interests; indeed, in ways they would not have acted
had they deliberated. This should lead to a cost-benefit analysis that reflects
4.

William M. Sage, Brand New Law! The Need to Market Health Care Reform, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2121,
2146 (2011); John Harwood, Next Big Challenge for Health Care Law: Carrying It Out, N.Y. Times
(April 29, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/us/politics/next-bigchallenge-for-health-law-carrying-it-out.html; Ezra Klein, The First Few Years of Health Reform
Could Be Very, Very Messy, Wash. Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2012/07/02/the-first-few-years-of-health-reform-could-be-very-very-messy/
(July
2,
2012, 7:40). The extraordinary complexity of implementing the statute can be seen in the
implementation timeline for the Act. See Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Health Reform
Implementation Timeline, http://kff.org/interactive/implementation-timeline/ (last visited
April 5, 2014).

5.

See Ben Protess, Deconstructing Dodd-Frank, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2012 at F12; Ted
Kaufman, Set Up To Fail: Dodd-Frank Leaves Bank Regulators Overwhelmed, Underfunded, Forbes
(July 19, 2013, 9:30), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/19/set-up-to-faildodd-frank-leaves-bank-regulators-overwhelmed-underfunded/.

6.

See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Michael D. Shear, Obama
Waves White Flag In Contraceptive Battle, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2013, at A19.

7.

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v.
SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 177–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

8.

Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981). See Robert W. Hahn and Cass
R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order For Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1489, 1506–07 (2002).

9.

See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future
Protection 139–40 (2002).
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the lessons of behavioral economics and consideration of whether “nudges”
provide the most appropriate regulatory response in many instances. He
defines nudges as “approaches that do not force anyone to do anything and
maintain freedom of choice, but have the potential to make people healthier,
wealthier, and happier.”10 By contrast, traditional regulatory approaches
impose legal prohibitions or modify incentives, through such mechanisms
as user fees and marketable permit systems. While behavioral economics is
discussed frequently in legal scholarship, agencies seem to explicitly invoke
the school of thought rather infrequently.11
Sunstein effortlessly establishes the basic tenets of behavioral economics:
that we often assess matters quickly and act with little deliberation in ways
that produce systematic errors that often lead us astray. We purchase a
product factoring in the cost savings from the easy mail-in rebate we anticipate
receiving, even though we will probably procrastinate and never claim it. We
select an investment portfolio and then, due to inertia, fail to rebalance it as
needed (55).12
Nudges can correct these cognitive biases (i.e., “de-bias” decision-making),
and help individuals make either the choices they would were they to
deliberate or the choices that serve them best. Two nudges Sunstein features
are default rules and disclosures. If a person has a choice, let’s say among
employee benefit plans, Sunstein advocates government specification of a
default choice, i.e., a particular option is deemed selected unless the person
chooses otherwise (119–21).13 If set correctly, the government-specified default
10.

Sunstein co-authored a book on nudges before his appointment to head OIRA: Richard H.
Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving D ecisions about Health, Wealth and
Happiness (2008).

11.

In 2013 alone, approximately 47 articles in the top 20 law journals had some reference to
behavioral economics. By contrast the term “behavioral economics” appears to have been
first used in an agency Federal Register notice (outside of citations and other non-substantive
references) in 2006, and during the years 2009 through 2013 was discussed by name in 15
notices (2 in 2009, 4 in 2010, 3 in 2011, 4 in 2012, and 2 in 2013). The paucity of references is
surprising given Sunstein’s position at OIRA and President Obama’s call for clarification
of “the role of the behavioral sciences in formulating regulatory policy.” Memorandum
on Regulatory Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 5977 (January 30, 2009). See also Unified Agenda, 74
Fed. Reg. 64131, 64137 (Dec. 7, 2009) (noting that OMB Director Peter Orszag, whom the
president had directed to clarify the role of behavioral sciences in policy formation, had
described behavioral economics as “one of the most important intellectual developments of
the past several years”).

12.

The studies Sunstein uses to illustrate cognitive biases are intriguing. For instance
he discusses one study in which two groups of subjects were offered the opportunity to
contribute to retirement accounts. One group was shown pictures of themselves as they
would appear in at age 70; the other was not. The former contributed twice as much to their
retirement accounts.

13.

Sunstein does acknowledge that sometimes requiring active choosing, i.e., not setting a
default, is most appropriate. He also notes (103) that private entities will sometimes specify
defaults for their own purposes (citing Google’s strategy for setting the default on its
Chrome web browser to discourage users from anonymously browsing the web).
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will benefit most individuals. If, as is likely, individuals do not make an active
choice, their interests will probably be served by the default choice. However,
those who desire another option face no obstacle in choosing it (124–26).14
Information disclosure can serve as a nudge, particularly when its design
reflects the lessons of behavioral economics, that is, when such disclosures
are “concrete, straightforward, simple, meaningful, timely, and salient” (93).15
Sunstein discusses the deliberations regarding the labels disclosing gas mileage
performance on new cars (MPG disclosures) to show how OIRA and the
relevant agencies considered the lessons of behavioral economics in designing
the disclosures (84–88). He also discusses the deliberations regarding the
change of the “food pyramid” to the “food plate,” the USDA’s new graphic
designed to educate the public about nutrition (75–78).
He emphasizes the importance of a disclosure’s salience, referencing
the “invisible gorilla” study. His main public policy example of the need
for salience is quite controversial—the requirement for graphic warnings of
cigarette smoking’s health risks. Cigarette packs have long carried warnings.
However, because identical warnings, consisting solely of text, appeared
on all packs, they faded into the background; they lacked salience (130). In
2009, Congress mandated that such warnings vary and include color graphics
depicting smoking’s health consequences, making them more salient by
engaging smokers’ visceral, emotional responses.
One need not study behavioral economics to appreciate the importance of
providing basic information about a product or service. But Sunstein discusses
another type of information that might influence behavior; government
might harness the power of social norms as an element of an information
disclosure strategy. Sunstein notes that in Great Britain the number of small
business owners remitting tax payments to the government increased when the
government’s warning letters informed recipients of the high rate of voluntary
compiance (67).16 Sunstein suggests that a higher percentage of Americans
might vote if advised of the turnout figures for their precinct (38). Such
disclosures seem to inject normative considerations into individuals’ choice,
encouraging them to do what the public-regarding citizen should wish to do,
not merely what the individual would do if merely de-biased.
14.

Sunstein also mentions “choice overload,” the counter-productive effect of offering too
much choice. He discusses the regulatory response to choice overload adopted with respect
to the proliferation of Medicare Part B offerings.

15.

He distinguishes “summary disclosure” (disclosure that provides the most important
information in an easily manageable format, such as labels, often at the point of sale) from
“full disclosure” (comprehensive information for individuals seeking detailed information,
often provided via the Internet) (78).

16.

More specifically, British authorities conducted a randomized trial in which one group
of taxpayers received the traditional warning letter and the other received the letter that
included voluntary compliance rates. The compliance rate of the latter group was fifteen
percentage points higher than the compliance rate of the former.
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Nudges address a distinct subset of the problems regulators face; they are
primarily appropriate when two conditions are met. First, individuals must
have real freedom of choice, like consumers choosing products or employees
choosing employee benefit plans. (Thus, for example, nudges should not be
used in regulating working conditions.) Second, those individuals’ interests
must align very closely with those of the public. Thus, behavioral economics and
nudges may serve as particularly appropriate tools to assess the government’s
own communications with citizens (such as the food plate/food pyramid) and
its regulation of businesses’ structuring of customer or employee choice (such
as MPG disclosures and mandatory employees benefit plan defaults).
But often individuals’ actions, such as decisions regarding product
purchase and product use, impose costs on others. Cars may diminish air
quality and dangerous products may create disproportionate risks for others.17
Ensuring that individuals fully deliberate regarding their own interests, i.e.,
counteracting their cognitive biases, will not necessarily lead them to weigh
the costs and risks imposed on others.
In addition, regulation often focuses on choices made by institutional
decision-makers, such as business enterprises. Questions of automobile
crashworthiness, workplace safety, and pollution control are questions of this
type. Individual decision-making reflects cognitive biases because individuals
often make impulsive decisions (42–48). Though business entities may often
act in ways that confound classical economists’ models, perhaps businesses
are less likely than individuals to act impulsively and more likely to calculate
costs and benefits.18 Thus, application of behavioral economics to business
decision-making and the use of nudges to affect such decisions will likely be
quite complicated.19
Nevertheless, behavioral economics does provide a justification for
“paternalistic” interventions; the two conditions set forth above, individuals’
freedom of choice and the alignment of individual and public interests,
generally hold with respect to such interventions. Paternalistic interventions
are some of the hardest for liberal democracies to justify, and the use of nudges
might make such interventions easier to justify and more palatable.
17.

Alternatively, the risk faced by the product user may be identical to that imposed on others,
but others may have a significantly lower tolerance for risk (particularly if, unlike the product
user, they are receiving no benefit from the product).

18.

While business enterprises are comprised of individual decision-makers who are subject to
cognitive biases, the institutional context may matter. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Judd E.
Stone II, Still Rare Like A Unicorn? The Case of Behavioral Predatory Pricing, 8 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y
859, 865 (2012); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1459, 1492 (2005)
(“Behavioral economics is squarely focused on individuals, not organizations.”).

19.

Behavioral economics may suggest that efforts to help individuals make sound choices be
abandoned in favor of regulation restraining business entities. See Howard Latin, “Good”
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1994); EPA & NHTSA,
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 25652–53 (May 7, 2010).
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Nudges possess great promise. Indeed, sometimes they may be more
effective than prohibitions, particularly where there is lax enforcement or
widespread violation of the law.20 At the very least, nudges might supplement
a prohibition on dangerous conduct.
However, nudges come in many varieties; different forms of nudging may
have different implications. Disclosure may de-bias individuals, essentially
giving them the information they would want were obtaining information
costless.21 Of course, the effect of such efforts will not necessarily be neutral.
Almost invariably, the regulator will have to choose which information the
consumer would likely consider most important, which consequently crowds
out other information, as consumers’ capacity to process information has
limits (194–95). But more importantly, regulators would almost inevitably go
beyond neutral de-biasing. They will surely be tempted to make consumers
aware of information that is important in terms of regulators’ goals,22 such
as reducing pollution or controlling the medical costs generated by poor
nutritional habits.
Indeed, controlling information may appeal to regulators in disquieting
ways. It appears much easier to justify nudges, the provision of information
and the modification of “choice architecture,” than legal prohibitions. The
“cost” appears minimal, and the benefits quite substantial (215). So rather
than ban a product that should perhaps be banned or specify a necessary
MPG standard, regulators might instead seek to manipulate consumer choice.
They may encounter far more muted objections from regulated entities than
they would have had they sought to impose a regulatory mandate.23 And any
20.

Texting while driving may be one such risky behavior. Sunstein recounts AT&T’s campaign
against texting while driving, entitled “The Last Text,” featuring the last texts sent by drivers
before fatal accidents (63).

21.

Availability of information is important even under classical economic theory; markets
might fail due to information asymmetries. Long before Sunstein’s arrival, OIRA had
directed agencies to consider “informational measures,” such as standardized testing
and rating systems, mandatory disclosure requirements, and government provision of
information, in deciding upon an appropriate regulatory response. Economic Analysis of
Federal Regulations under Executive Order 12866 (Jan. 11, 1996), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_riaguide.

22.

Thus, some states have enacted legislation requiring doctors to show pregnant women
an ultrasound image of their fetus before performing an abortion. E.g., Women’s Right
to Know Act, 2011 N.C. Laws S.L. 2011–405 (codified at N.C.G.S.A. § 90-21.85) (held
unconstitutional in Stuart v. Loomis,—F. Supp. 2d—, 2014 WL 186310 (M.D.N.C. 2014)).
Such a requirement might be viewed as a “nudge,” albeit one that can create a great
deal of emotional trauma. See Bonnie Rochman, Requiring Ultrasounds Before Abortion: One
Mother’s Personal Tragedy, Time (March 23, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/03/23/
requring-ultrasounds-before-abortion-one-mothers-personal-tragedy/.

23.

Such approaches may not meet resistance from regulated entities because of the ease with
which they can be circumvented. Sunstein uses the failure of the Federal Reserve Board’s
effort to protect bank customers from overdraft fees as an example of a failed default rule.
Banks were barred from charging such fees absent the depositor’s explicit consent; depositors
were defaulted into rejecting overdraft protection. But because the bank controlled the
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objections may also be less salient to the public, and thus less likely to create
public controversy. After all, disclosures can always be ignored and defaults
can easily be rejected. So even assuming full transparency of regulators’
consideration of nudges as the appropriate regulatory response, the quality and
intensity of public deliberation may suffer given nudges’ minimal salience.24
Sunstein argues that transparency provides a shield against regulators’ misuse
of nudges, but nudges’ potential lack of salience may undermine his point.
More fundamentally, should people be steered away from choices by subtly
manipulating the presentation of choices and the available information about
those choices? The Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of such an
approach in the First Amendment context. In conjunction with prohibiting
harmful conduct, the government may prohibit advertising that informs the
public of opportunities to engage in such illegal conduct. But so long as the
government allows the conduct to remain legal, it cannot discourage it by
imposing advertising bans that seek to manipulate consumer conduct.25
Indeed, does subtly manipulating choice by nudges undermine the
relationship of citizen to government, causing citizens to view their government
as taking advantage of their vulnerabilities for its own purposes? People may
expect such efforts at manipulation from private entities, but should they
expect it from their government?
Cigarette warnings raise additional issues. It is surely laudable to provide
government information in ways people view as relevant and comprehensible—
the point of Sunstein’s “Plate, Not Pyramid” chapter. But the smoking
regulation seems quite different. The graphic cigarette warnings do not merely
provide information, but seek to evoke an emotional response to accomplish
regulators’ objectives (158).26 Should such powerful tools be at government
agencies’ disposal?
Sunstein acknowledges the potential for abuse, but believes it can easily be
cabined. The examples he uses, however, are the easiest with which to cope:
executive branch officials furthering the administration’s partisan interests
(202–03, 207–08, 196–97).27 Worse still, identifying self-serving messages may
context in which the choice to accept overdraft protection was made, most depositors chose
overdraft protection, rejecting the government-specified default (118–19).
24.

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.484, 509 (1996) (“the advertising ban served to
shield the State’s anti-gambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech
regulation would draw”); See also Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 133, 151–52 (2006).

25.

44 Liquormart, supra note 24, at 510–11.

26.

See also Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government
Expression In America 166–67 (1983) (discussing government communication and First
Amendment constraints). Sunstein mounts a stronger defense than he could in other
contexts, arguing that the government is seeking to counteract private entities’ emotional
appeals in advertising cigarettes as well as nicotine’s addictive qualities (199).

27.

Yudof, supra note 26, at 196-97.

Book Review: Simpler

133

be challenging; it is often difficult to distinguish such messages from those
that serve legitimate public purposes.28
The use of defaults can raise similar issues.29 Defaults, of course, go beyond
providing information—they make tentative decisions for individuals that
individuals must reverse.30 The major question is how the defaults are to be
set: will they be set based on predictions about what the individual (or most
individuals) would do, whether or not regulators believe that choice to be in
the individual’s best interest? Are they set based on the regulator’s assessment
of the individual’s best interests?31
Or might the default be based on what would best serve society, to nudge
people toward public-regarding decisions?32 A default favoring organ donation
might be set, not to reflect general attitudes, but because organ donation saves
lives, thus “encouraging” individuals to make the public-regarding choice (59,
103).33 After all, an individual’s interests may differ from society’s because, as
noted earlier, individuals themselves may create externalities, by imposing
costs on others that they need not consider. Perhaps in such circumstances,
nudges are inappropriate. But it will be enticing to craft nudges that appeal to
public spiritedness, for example “disclosures” advising people of social norms
with regard to paying taxes or voting.
28.

In re. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n—Prohibitions on Grassroots Lobbying and Publicity
or Propaganda, B-322882, 2012 WL 5489123 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 8, 2012) (“It is often difficult
to determine whether [materials agencies provide the public] are political or not because
the lines separating the nonpolitical from the political cannot be precisely drawn.”); Yudof,
supra note 26, at 170–73.

29.

The power of inertia is not a new revelation. Indeed, a major administrative law case decided
30 years ago discussed driver inertia, and NHTSA’s failure to properly account for its effects:
Motor Vehicles Mfs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 54 (1983).

30.

Once again they may provoke fewer objections than more robust regulatory responses, after
all, the public will be assuaged by retaining the right to reject the default choice, and given
cognitive biases people overestimate the likelihood they will do so.

31.

Dep’t Of Labor, Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., Final Rule, Default Investment Alternatives
Under Participant Directed Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60452, 60476 (October 24,
2007) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550) (“[T]he regulation’s primary goal is to promote
default investments that enhance retirement saving, not to align default investments with
individuals’ levels of risk tolerance.”).

32.

See text accompanying notes 14 and 15, supra. Other default-setting approaches are available.
The least objectionable choice could be selected as the default. For example, perhaps we
believe it more offensive to take organs from deceased individuals who would not have
wanted them taken, say for religious reasons, than to refrain from using an organ of a
deceased person who would have donated had they not procrastinated (103). Or, the default
could be set to encourage active choosing. A default choice might withhold a significant
amount of wages for retirement, on a theory that excessive withholding will be more salient
than inadequate withholding.

33.

“If you want to increase the number of organs available for people who need them, an
effective way to do so is to presume that people consent . . . to donate but allow them to opt
out if they wish.”

134

Journal of Legal Education

And there is yet another problem: is everyone defaulted to the same choice
(let’s say the likely majority choice)? As Sunstein notes, sometimes various
population subgroups differ in ways that might make group-specific defaults
appropriate.34 Thus, he suggests, perhaps different defaults should be set for
different subgroups.
However, if the defaults are based on subgroups’ general characteristics,
individuals who don’t share their subgroup’s attitudes may be disadvantaged
by being defaulted to the subgroup choice. This might be particularly
problematic if the subgroups are drawn along racial or gender lines. Differences
in life expectancy, for example, might mean that on the whole members of one
racial group or one gender would be better served by one benefit or retirement
plan rather than another, even though the atypical individual in that group
would be made worse off. Perhaps such criteria would be precluded from
consideration on constitutional grounds.35 However, presumably salary level
would not be a constitutionally-suspect means of classification. Would lowerpaid workers be defaulted into a less costly, less generous retirement program
that might benefit lower-paid workers as a whole, but at the expense of the
minority of such workers who can and would forgo current consumption for a
more generous retirement plan? Such workers could reject the default, but as
Sunstein acknowledges, many will not.
For Sunstein the answer to these challenges may lay in “personalized
defaults.” “Once enough information is available about Joe Smith, we could
design [default rules] for Joe Smith” (155). But regulators would lose control
over private entities’ establishment of such personalized defaults, because
the algorithms used to create such defaults would surely be too complex for
government mandates. Moreover, the personalized default approach assumes
that “Joe Smith” has an unusually tolerant view toward the collection and use
of his private data; in other words, privacy concerns may pose a major obstacle
to mandating personalized defaults.36
Ultimately, Simpler does not tell us what happened to the “era of regulation”
that seemed just beyond the horizon six short years ago—that’s not the point of
the book and the answer to that question probably has much more to do with
politics than with any particular regulatory decisions made by OIRA or any
34.

Though Sunstein does not use this example, it appears that African-Americans as a group
are significantly less likely to donate organs than Caucasians. See, e.g., Laura A. Siminoff, et
al., Racial Disparities in Preferences and Perceptions Regarding Organ Donation, 21 J. Gen’l Internal
Med. 995 (2006).

35.

See, e.g., Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (gender discrimination
in state-selected pension plan); Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and GenderSpecific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1994).

36.

Moreover, Sunstein largely ignores the temporal challenges for default rules. Agencies
are quite slow in modifying regulations or requirements. New employee benefit plans
may arise that provide better options and might warrant modifying a default rule. Will
agencies be nimble enough to change their default rules quickly enough to respond to such
developments?
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agency. However, Simpler does provide a wonderful perspective on the creative
ways in which government may regulate while preserving individual choice.

